Wibawanto Nugroho , Jakarta | Tue, 12/30/2008 11:02 AM | OpinionThe Jakarta Post
Attacks in Mumbai have once again shocked the world. Terrorism has become one of the most pervasive and critical threats to world security in recent history. Terrorist violence has changed in recent years from an agenda-forcing and attention-getting tool of the politically disenfranchised to a significant asymmetric form of conflict employed against anything considered an adversary to economic, political, military or social aims. It is not exaggerating to define terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to instill fear and aimed to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.
Having described such radical and restless dedication in committing terrorism, we need to understand how radicalism enters into the terrorist's mind. Everything begins from the political, economic and social grievances that have led to the creation of some sort of social movement.
On many occasions Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono has emphasized that a critical underlying factor leading to violence is the huge population which exacerbates the imbalance in economic development and corruption in the government and nongovernment sectors as well as poverty.
At this stage, radical ideology enters as the key intervening variable and source of endless courage. When splinters further their action in regular violent activities and operate independently in loose networks, terrorism begins to break away from the social movement.
Once they become clandestine, they are separated from society and are joined by the bonds of solidarity with people who share the same values and purposes. Under these conditions, they reinforce each other to take certain collective actions and at the same time they began to attack innocent people.
At this stage their activity can be mentioned as terrorism. However, based on the nature of fighting it, the usually repressive counterterrorism measures taken by authorities will unfortunately open up the possibility of adverse reactions, in which terrorists, within a certain degree, will have more courage, support and the capability to continue fighting back, thus creating more terrorism.
Thus, having seen the characteristics of terrorism and radicalism in the midst of global economic uncertainty it is very likely that terrorism will become a new form of war and the trend of low-intensity conflicts will surge in the future. Thus it is imperative as well to understand the strategic challenge that terrorism represents, as it would be imprudent to isolate it as just small tactical attacks.
The U.S. Army defines Low-Intensity Conflict as a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below a conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It often involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies, thus ranging from subversion to the use of the armed forces.
It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications such as what happened in Bali and Mumbai in these past six years.
However, low-intensity conflicts cover a wide spectrum including combating illegal drug trafficking, terrorism and counter-terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency and other special operations needed to counter activities which threaten security and require a government response (whether revolutionary or nonrevolutionary, political or nonpolitical and open or clandestine).
Normally, religious, racial and social or ideological conflicts (i.e., radical terrorism) are total wars, long-term and very violent because they are low-rational conflict as compared to conventional wars among states.
In order to be successful in low-intensity conflicts, states require the simultaneous and combined commitment of political and economical resources supported by effective intelligence, law enforcement and military force at different levels during the entire process.
On the government side, victory in low-intensity conflicts can be considered achieved in situations where the threatened government is able to conquer or pacify the illegitimate arms-organized group or limit the conflict to a manageable proportion at a domestically "acceptable" cost, whose acceptance of such a cost is often subject to debate and controversy.
Given the protracted nature of low-intensity conflicts, this sort of conflict is unfortunately rarely attractive to the general public, bureaucrats or the military leaders. However, keys to be successful in overcoming the so-called "future small-scale wars" can be learned from several countries (U.K, Canada, German, France and Israel) and are characterized as follows.
First, any nation that has many organizations combating terrorism must make them subservient to one lead government ministry. But because many other ministries are also involved, there must be interagency coordination bodies to coordinate both within and across ministries.
Second, who is in charge during a terrorist incident must be clearly designated.
Third, there must be intelligence measures, national policies and military function-based systems and infrastructure that emphasize the prevention of terrorism. To achieve these policies, it is important to use a variety of strategies, including intelligence collection, police presence and such various security measures as physical barriers at the entrances to public buildings.
Fourth, executive branches must provide the primary oversight of organizations involved in combating terrorism. This oversight involves the review of programs and resources for effectiveness, efficiency and legality.
Last but not least, resource allocation must be based upon the likelihood of follow through of threats, as determined by intelligence assessments.
The writer is an expert staff for Chairman of Committee I, DPR-RI and special assistant for Director of Strategy Policy, Directorate General of Defense Strategy, Indonesian Department of Defense. This is a personal view.
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